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Rent-seeking government and endogenous takeoff in a Schumpeterian economy

Angus C. Chu, Yuichi Furukawa, Xilin Wang

Journal of Macroeconomics · 2022-06 · 72 · 103399

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmacro.2022.103399 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Macroeconomics, 2022-06. Verfasst von Angus C. Chu und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 45 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This study explores how the rent-seeking behavior of the government may impede economic development and delay industrialization. Introducing a rent-seeking government to the Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous takeo⁄, we (cid:133)nd that a more self-interested government engages more in rent-seeking taxation, which delays the transition of the economy from pre-industrial stagnation to modern economic growth. Quantitatively, a completely self-interested government delays industrialization, relative to a benevolent government, by eight decades.

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APA

Chu, A. C., Furukawa, Y., & Wang, X. (2022). Rent-seeking government and endogenous takeoff in a Schumpeterian economy. Journal of Macroeconomics, 72, 103399. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2022.103399

Vancouver

Chu AC, Furukawa Y, Wang X. Rent-seeking government and endogenous takeoff in a Schumpeterian economy. Journal of Macroeconomics. 2022;72:103399. doi:10.1016/j.jmacro.2022.103399

BibTeX
@article{Chu2022,
  author = {Chu, Angus C. and Furukawa, Yuichi and Wang, Xilin},
  title = {Rent-seeking government and endogenous takeoff in a Schumpeterian economy},
  journal = {Journal of Macroeconomics},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {72},
  pages = {103399},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jmacro.2022.103399}
}
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