Nonbossy mechanisms: Mechanism design robust to secondary goals
Journal of Economic Theory · 2026-06 · 235 · 106187
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106187 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Economic Theory, 2026-06. Verfasst von Renato Paes Leme und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 72 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study mechanism design when agents may have hidden secondary goals which will play a role when the primary utility of the outcomes is the same. We show that in such cases, a mechanism is immune to strategic manipulation if and only if it is incentive compatible with regard to primary utility -- a property we term"primary incentive compatibility"-- and nonbossy -- a well-studied property in the context of matching and allocation mechanisms. We give complete characterizations of primarily incentive-compatible and nonbossy mechanisms in various settings, including auctions with single-parameter agents and public decision settings where all agents share a common outcome. In particular, we show that in the single-item setting, a mechanism is primarily incentive compatible, individually rational, and nonbossy if and only if it is a sequential posted-price mechanism.
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APA
Leme, R. P., Schneider, J., & Zhang, H. (2026). Nonbossy mechanisms: Mechanism design robust to secondary goals. Journal of Economic Theory, 235, 106187. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2026.106187
Vancouver
Leme RP, Schneider J, Zhang H. Nonbossy mechanisms: Mechanism design robust to secondary goals. Journal of Economic Theory. 2026;235:106187. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2026.106187
BibTeX
@article{Leme2026,
author = {Leme, Renato Paes and Schneider, Jon and Zhang, Hanrui},
title = {Nonbossy mechanisms: Mechanism design robust to secondary goals},
journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
year = {2026},
volume = {235},
pages = {106187},
doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2026.106187}
}
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