Covert learning and disclosure
Journal of Economic Theory · 2026-06 · 235 · 106179
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106179 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Economic Theory, 2026-06. Verfasst von Matteo Escudé. Die Arbeit nennt 44 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Comer Science and Education Foundation.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
I study a model of information acquisition and transmission in which the sender's ability to misreport her findings is limited. The sender learns covertly, so a key observation is that in equilibrium she must be deterred from undetectably worsening the meaning of the messages she sends. This force substantially disciplines equilibrium beliefs and behavior: the receiver is maximally skeptical of what the sender claims and learns all discovered information. I exploit these equilibrium properties to characterize the sense in which the sender benefits from her claims being more verifiable, showing that this is akin to increasing her commitment power. Finally, I identify sender- and receiver-optimal falsification environments.
Förderung
- Comer Science and Education Foundation
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APA
Escudé, M. (2026). Covert learning and disclosure. Journal of Economic Theory, 235, 106179. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2026.106179
Vancouver
Escudé M. Covert learning and disclosure. Journal of Economic Theory. 2026;235:106179. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2026.106179
BibTeX
@article{Escud2026,
author = {Escudé, Matteo},
title = {Covert learning and disclosure},
journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
year = {2026},
volume = {235},
pages = {106179},
doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2026.106179}
}
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