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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Observer-based false data injection attack resilient event-triggered control of microgrid load frequency control system

Athira M Mohan, Nader Meskin

ISA Transactions · 2025-09 · 164 · 46-60

DOI: 10.1016/j.isatra.2025.05.030 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift ISA Transactions, 2025-09. Verfasst von Athira M Mohan und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Electrical Engineering, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 20-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 41 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Qatar National Library.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This study develops a secondary attack resilient observer-based event-triggered control (AROETC) strategy to counter false data injection (FDI) attack at the secondary measurement channel of an islanded microgrid load frequency control (LFC) system with auxiliary/virtual inertia (VI) control loop. The considered microgrid LFC system configuration consists of a local uncompromised VI control loop and a remotely located observer-based secondary controller that ensures FDI attack resilience and communication efficiency. The VI control loop employs a proposed regional pole placement (RPP)-based state feedback auxiliary controller for attaining desired VI performance. The RPP technique of the VI control strategy allows auxiliary control gain tuning by positioning the closed-loop auxiliary poles at the locations described by RPP parameters and thus ensures required auxiliary frequency regulation. Further, the secondary observer and controller gains, ensuring FDI attack resilience and prescribed H∞ performance, are derived using Lyapunov-Krasovskii functional stability analysis, considering secondary measurement channel communication delay, output-based event-triggering condition, remote secondary observer location, and deceptive frequency measurement signal model. Additionally, the impact of FDI attack and the efficacy of the proposed FDI AROETC method are validated through simulation analysis under various disturbance input profiles.

Schlagwörter

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

Event-triggered communicationFDI attack resilienceObserver-based controlRegional pole placement

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Electrical Engineering, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar.
  • Department of Electrical Engineering, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar. Electronic address: nader.meskin@qu.edu.qa.

Förderung

  • Qatar National Library

Zitieren

APA

Mohan, A. M., & Meskin, N. (2025). Observer-based false data injection attack resilient event-triggered control of microgrid load frequency control system. ISA Transactions, 164, 46-60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isatra.2025.05.030

Vancouver

Mohan AM, Meskin N. Observer-based false data injection attack resilient event-triggered control of microgrid load frequency control system. ISA Transactions. 2025;164:46-60. doi:10.1016/j.isatra.2025.05.030

BibTeX
@article{Mohan2025,
  author = {Mohan, Athira M and Meskin, Nader},
  title = {Observer-based false data injection attack resilient event-triggered control of microgrid load frequency control system},
  journal = {ISA Transactions},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {164},
  pages = {46--60},
  doi = {10.1016/j.isatra.2025.05.030}
}
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