Can executive equity incentives enhance corporate debt-paying ability?—An analysis based on the moderating mechanism of patient capital
International Review of Economics & Finance · 2025-09 · 102 · 104347
DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2025.104347 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Review of Economics & Finance, 2025-09. Verfasst von Fang Fang und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 14-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 24 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Kein Abstract verfügbar.
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
Zitieren
APA
Fang, F., & Chen, D. (2025). Can executive equity incentives enhance corporate debt-paying ability?—An analysis based on the moderating mechanism of patient capital. International Review of Economics & Finance, 102, 104347. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2025.104347
Vancouver
Fang F, Chen D. Can executive equity incentives enhance corporate debt-paying ability?—An analysis based on the moderating mechanism of patient capital. International Review of Economics & Finance. 2025;102:104347. doi:10.1016/j.iref.2025.104347
BibTeX
@article{Fang2025,
author = {Fang, Fang and Chen, Dan},
title = {Can executive equity incentives enhance corporate debt-paying ability?—An analysis based on the moderating mechanism of patient capital},
journal = {International Review of Economics & Finance},
year = {2025},
volume = {102},
pages = {104347},
doi = {10.1016/j.iref.2025.104347}
}
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