Reduced strategies and cognitive hierarchies in the extensive and normal form
Games and Economic Behavior · 2026-06 · 158 · 317-329
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.006 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Games and Economic Behavior, 2026-06. Verfasst von Pierpaolo Battigalli. Die Arbeit nennt 29 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In a recent paper, Lin & Palfrey (2024) developed a theory of cognitive hierarchies (CH) in sequential games and observed that this solution concept is not reduced-normal-form invariant. In this paper I qualify and explain this observation. I show that the CH model is normal-form invariant , and that the di⁄erences arising from the application of the CH model to the reduced normal form depend only on how randomization by level-0 types is modeled. Indeed, while the uniform behavior strategy in the extensive form yields the uniform mixed strategy in the normal form, the latter does not correspond to the uniform randomization in the reduced normal form, because di⁄erent reduced strategies may correspond to sets of equivalent strategies with di⁄erent cardinalities. I also comment on (i) the invariance of the CH model to some transformations of the sequential game, and (ii) the independence of conditional beliefs about co-players(cid:146)level-types.
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APA
Battigalli, P. (2026). Reduced strategies and cognitive hierarchies in the extensive and normal form. Games and Economic Behavior, 158, 317-329. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.006
Vancouver
Battigalli P. Reduced strategies and cognitive hierarchies in the extensive and normal form. Games and Economic Behavior. 2026;158:317-329. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.006
BibTeX
@article{Battigalli2026,
author = {Battigalli, Pierpaolo},
title = {Reduced strategies and cognitive hierarchies in the extensive and normal form},
journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
year = {2026},
volume = {158},
pages = {317--329},
doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.006}
}
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