Representation in collective policymaking
Games and Economic Behavior · 2026-06 · 158 · 237-259
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.002 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Games and Economic Behavior, 2026-06. Verfasst von Daniel Gibbs und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 68 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study a policy-motivated principal choosing a representative to bargain over one-dimensional policy. The principal can constrain extremist proposers by (i) shifting (de facto) veto players, or (ii) biasing towards veto players, which improves their policymaking expectations and narrows what would pass. The principal may want to bias inward, but never outward. For a wide interval of principals, optimal representatives are unique, strictly increasing in the principal’s ideal point, and biased away from their ideal point towards a central location. In extensions, we study mass representation, the value of representation, and competitive representation.
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APA
Gibbs, D., & Judd, G. (2026). Representation in collective policymaking. Games and Economic Behavior, 158, 237-259. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.002
Vancouver
Gibbs D, Judd G. Representation in collective policymaking. Games and Economic Behavior. 2026;158:237-259. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.002
BibTeX
@article{Gibbs2026,
author = {Gibbs, Daniel and Judd, Gleason},
title = {Representation in collective policymaking},
journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
year = {2026},
volume = {158},
pages = {237--259},
doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.002}
}
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