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How banking regulation affects collusion sustainability: A multimarket contact approach
Economics Letters · 2026-06 · 265 · 112962
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112962 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Economics Letters, 2026-06. Verfasst von Laura Prekwinkel und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 11 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Kein Abstract verfügbar.
Förderung
- Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
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APA
Prekwinkel, L., Brito, D., & Vasconcelos, H. (2026). How banking regulation affects collusion sustainability: A multimarket contact approach. Economics Letters, 265, 112962. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112962
Vancouver
Prekwinkel L, Brito D, Vasconcelos H. How banking regulation affects collusion sustainability: A multimarket contact approach. Economics Letters. 2026;265:112962. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112962
BibTeX
@article{Prekwinkel2026,
author = {Prekwinkel, Laura and Brito, Duarte and Vasconcelos, Helder},
title = {How banking regulation affects collusion sustainability: A multimarket contact approach},
journal = {Economics Letters},
year = {2026},
volume = {265},
pages = {112962},
doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112962}
}
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