EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Forensic readiness of industrial control systems under stealthy attacks

Mazen Azzam, Liliana Pasquale, Gregory Provan, Bashar Nuseibeh

Computers & Security · 2023-02 · 125 · 103010

DOI: 10.1016/j.cose.2022.103010 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Computers & Security, 2023-02. Verfasst von Mazen Azzam und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 28-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 44 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, Science Foundation Ireland.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Cyberattacks against Industrial Control Systems (ICS) can have harmful physical impacts. Investigating such attacks can be difficult, as evidence could be lost to physical damage. This is especially true with stealthy attacks ; i.e., attacks that can evade detection. In this paper, we aim to engineer Forensic Readiness (FR) in safety-critical, geographically distributed ICS, by proactively collecting potential evidence of stealthy attacks. The collection of all data generated by an ICS at all times is infeasible due to the large volume of such data. Hence, our approach only triggers data collection when there is the possibility for a potential stealthy attack to cause damage. We determine the conditions for such an event by performing predictive, model-based, safety checks. Furthermore, we use the geographical layout of the ICS and the safety predictions to identify data that is at risk of being lost due to damage, i.e., relevant data. Finally, to reduce the control performance overhead resulting from real-time data collection, we select a subset of relevant data to collect by performing a trade-off between expected impact of the attack and the estimated cost of collection. We demonstrate these ideas using simulations of the widely-used Tennessee– Eastman Process (TEP) benchmark. We show that the proposed approach does not miss relevant data and results in a reduced control performance overhead compared to the case when all data generated by the ICS is collected. We also showcase the applicability of our approach in improving the efficiency of existing ICS forensic log analysis tools. © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ )

Förderung

  • Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
  • Science Foundation Ireland

Zitieren

APA

Azzam, M., Pasquale, L., Provan, G., & Nuseibeh, B. (2023). Forensic readiness of industrial control systems under stealthy attacks. Computers & Security, 125, 103010. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2022.103010

Vancouver

Azzam M, Pasquale L, Provan G, Nuseibeh B. Forensic readiness of industrial control systems under stealthy attacks. Computers & Security. 2023;125:103010. doi:10.1016/j.cose.2022.103010

BibTeX
@article{Azzam2023,
  author = {Azzam, Mazen and Pasquale, Liliana and Provan, Gregory and Nuseibeh, Bashar},
  title = {Forensic readiness of industrial control systems under stealthy attacks},
  journal = {Computers & Security},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {125},
  pages = {103010},
  doi = {10.1016/j.cose.2022.103010}
}
Kostenlos starten →