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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

You’re free when you choose what i like: Flexible attributions of free choice under manipulation

Christos Bechlivanidis, Magda Osman

Consciousness and Cognition · 2026

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2026.104111 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Consciousness and Cognition, 2026. Verfasst von Christos Bechlivanidis und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, United Kingdom. Electronic address: c.bechlivanidis@ucl.ac.uk. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Personal Autonomy, Choice Behavior, Social Perception, Unconscious, Psychology. Die Arbeit nennt 66 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The existence of mechanisms that operate below conscious awareness (e.g. unconscious bias, microtargeting, dark patterns) and the degree to which they may threaten our autonomy fascinate and challenge us in equal measure. Although concepts like free will and consciousness are being extensively debated in (experimental) philosophy, we know remarkably little about how everyday people perceive threats to their autonomy. Still, ethical debates and ensuing policy often assume that any manipulative attempt, conscious or otherwise, is perceived as worrisome and autonomy-threatening. The present work evaluates how these positions align with public perceptions of freedom and autonomy under conscious or unconscious manipulation. We take a novel approach by grounding experimental scenarios in situations members of the public have volunteered. Across three studies (N=1462), findings show that in realistic and relatable scenarios, people hold nuanced, pragmatic views. They are generally reluctant to conclude that choices are not free, even in cases of direct, successful, and inaccessible manipulation. When evaluating freedom of choice, people consider choice importance, victim identity (self vs. others), and the counterfactual case. Intriguingly, whether participants themselves like the outcome or not affects their evaluation of the victim's freedom, even if the victim's preferences are subverted. Overall, people judge there to be a lack of freedom only after a search across plausible causal factors fails to account for anomalous choice outcomes. We propose this as a viable rational cognitive process, contrasting with claims of public irrationality, underappreciation, or misunderstanding of core philosophical concepts.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Personal AutonomyChoice BehaviorSocial PerceptionUnconscious, PsychologyConsciousnessHumansAdultMaleFemaleYoung Adult

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

AutonomyFree willManipulationMicrotargetingUnconscious

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, United Kingdom. Electronic address: c.bechlivanidis@ucl.ac.uk.
  • Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, , United Kingdom.

Zitieren

APA

Bechlivanidis, C., & Osman, M. (2026). You’re free when you choose what i like: Flexible attributions of free choice under manipulation. Consciousness and Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2026.104111

Vancouver

Bechlivanidis C, Osman M. You’re free when you choose what i like: Flexible attributions of free choice under manipulation. Consciousness and Cognition. 2026. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2026.104111

BibTeX
@article{Bechlivanidis2026,
  author = {Bechlivanidis, Christos and Osman, Magda},
  title = {You’re free when you choose what i like: Flexible attributions of free choice under manipulation},
  journal = {Consciousness and Cognition},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2026.104111}
}
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