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Ontological conceptions of information cannot account for consciousness

Peter Ulric Tse

Consciousness and Cognition · 2024

DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103772 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Consciousness and Cognition, 2024. Verfasst von Peter Ulric Tse. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Dept. of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Dartmouth College, United States. Electronic address: Peter.Tse@dartmouth.edu. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Consciousness. Die Arbeit nennt 48 Literaturangaben.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Epistemological and ontological conceptions of information are contrasted. The former are based on acts of decoding of extrinsic inputs that result in a decoder becoming informed. The latter are based on intrinsic states or state changes of the system independent of any external factors such as inputs to the system. Ontological conceptions of information, such as those that underlie integrated information theory or any theory that allies itself with panpsychism, are not able to account for consciousness. In the only physical systems that are known to be conscious, namely, animal brains, acts of decoding extrinsic inputs are central to creating consciousness and its contents. Moreover, only a very specific subset of decodings should realize consciousness, because consciousness in animals evolved to create an evaluative experience of what is intrinsically true about the world and the body, which is then used in a perception-action cycle that affords choices among options for behaving in the world in order to accomplish goals.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

ConsciousnessAnimalsHumansBrainInformation TheoryKnowledgePsychological Theory

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

ConsciousnessDecodingInformationPanpsychism

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Dept. of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Dartmouth College, United States. Electronic address: Peter.Tse@dartmouth.edu.

Zitieren

APA

Tse, P. U. (2024). Ontological conceptions of information cannot account for consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2024.103772

Vancouver

Tse PU. Ontological conceptions of information cannot account for consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition. 2024. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2024.103772

BibTeX
@article{Tse2024,
  author = {Tse, Peter Ulric},
  title = {Ontological conceptions of information cannot account for consciousness},
  journal = {Consciousness and Cognition},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2024.103772}
}
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