Crossref
Political tournaments, government outsourcing, and unproductive infrastructure: Evidence from China's highway projects
Cities · 2026-07 · 174 · 106981
DOI: 10.1016/j.cities.2026.106981 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Cities, 2026-07. Verfasst von Wei Xiong und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 101 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Tongji University, National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Kein Abstract verfügbar.
Förderung
- Tongji University
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
Zitieren
APA
Xiong, W., & Ye, Z. (2026). Political tournaments, government outsourcing, and unproductive infrastructure: Evidence from China's highway projects. Cities, 174, 106981. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2026.106981
Vancouver
Xiong W, Ye Z. Political tournaments, government outsourcing, and unproductive infrastructure: Evidence from China's highway projects. Cities. 2026;174:106981. doi:10.1016/j.cities.2026.106981
BibTeX
@article{Xiong2026,
author = {Xiong, Wei and Ye, Zhou},
title = {Political tournaments, government outsourcing, and unproductive infrastructure: Evidence from China's highway projects},
journal = {Cities},
year = {2026},
volume = {174},
pages = {106981},
doi = {10.1016/j.cities.2026.106981}
}
EUVIMED