EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Political equality, coalition formation, and economic performance in autocracies

Yang Yao

China Economic Quarterly International · 2021

DOI: 10.1016/j.ceqi.2020.11.001 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift China Economic Quarterly International, 2021. Verfasst von Yang Yao. Die Arbeit nennt 21 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Autocracies have diverse records of economic growth. This paper provides a theory of endogenous coalition formation to explain economic performance in autocracy. The nature of the ruling coalition that the autocrat relies on to rule the society and extract rents affects the degree of inclusiveness of the autocracy's political and economic institutions that ultimately determines economic performance. A stable ruling coalition has to be invasion-proof --- i.e., being able to resist invasion from outside --- and coalition-proof --- i.e., being able to prevent split from inside. In a political environment where side payments are allowed to buy political support, a ruling coalition is coalition-proof if and only if it satisfies Condition E, i.e., every pair of its member groups holds similar levels of political power relative to the power of any third group (including the autocrat). When more pairs of groups satisfy Condition E in a society, the ultimate ruling coalition becomes more inclusive and societal output is increased.

Zitieren

APA

Yao, Y. (2021). Political equality, coalition formation, and economic performance in autocracies. China Economic Quarterly International. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ceqi.2020.11.001

Vancouver

Yao Y. Political equality, coalition formation, and economic performance in autocracies. China Economic Quarterly International. 2021. doi:10.1016/j.ceqi.2020.11.001

BibTeX
@article{Yao2021,
  author = {Yao, Yang},
  title = {Political equality, coalition formation, and economic performance in autocracies},
  journal = {China Economic Quarterly International},
  year = {2021},
  doi = {10.1016/j.ceqi.2020.11.001}
}
Kostenlos starten →