AI wellbeing
Asian Journal of Philosophy · 01.02.2025 · 4 (1)
DOI: 10.1007/s44204-025-00246-2 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Asian Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 01.02.2025. Verfasst von Simon Goldstein und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 30-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 79 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Center for AI Safety.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Under what conditions would an artificially intelligent system have wellbeing? Despite its clear bearing on the ethics of human interactions with artificial systems, this question has received little direct attention. Because all major theories of wellbeing hold that an individual’s welfare level is partially determined by their mental life, we begin by considering whether artificial systems have mental states. We show that a wide range of theories of mental states, when combined with leading theories of wellbeing, predict that certain existing artificial systems have wellbeing. Along the way, we argue that there are good reasons to believe that artificial systems can have wellbeing even if they are not phenomenally conscious. While we do not claim to demonstrate conclusively that AI systems have wellbeing, we argue that there is a significant probability that some AI systems have or will soon have wellbeing and that this should lead us to reassess our relationship with the intelligent systems we create.
Förderung
- Center for AI Safety
Zitieren
APA
Goldstein, S., & Kirk-Giannini, C. D. (2025). AI wellbeing. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 4(1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-025-00246-2
Vancouver
Goldstein S, Kirk-Giannini CD. AI wellbeing. Asian Journal of Philosophy. 2025;4(1). doi:10.1007/s44204-025-00246-2
BibTeX
@article{Goldstein2025,
author = {Goldstein, Simon and Kirk-Giannini, Cameron Domenico},
title = {AI wellbeing},
journal = {Asian Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2025},
volume = {4},
number = {1},
doi = {10.1007/s44204-025-00246-2}
}
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