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Parfitian or Buddhist reductionism? Revisiting a debate about personal identity

Javier Hidalgo

Asian Journal of Philosophy · 14.05.2024 · 3 (1)

DOI: 10.1007/s44204-024-00166-7 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Asian Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 14.05.2024. Verfasst von Javier Hidalgo. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 28 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Derek Parfit influentially defends reductionism about persons, the view that a person’s existence just consists in the existence of a brain and body and the occurrence of a series of physical and mental events. Yet some critics, particularly Mark Johnston, have raised powerful objections to Parfit’s reductionism. In this paper, I defend reductionism against Johnston. In particular, I defend a radical form of reductionism that Buddhist philosophers developed. Buddhist reductionism can justify key features of Parfit’s position, such as the claims that personal identity is not what matters and can also be indeterminate. Furthermore, Buddhist reductionism can avoid Johnston’s objections to Parfit’s reductionism. I conclude that reductionists have good reasons to favor Buddhist reductionism over Parfit’s version.

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APA

Hidalgo, J. (2024). Parfitian or Buddhist reductionism? Revisiting a debate about personal identity. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 3(1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-024-00166-7

Vancouver

Hidalgo J. Parfitian or Buddhist reductionism? Revisiting a debate about personal identity. Asian Journal of Philosophy. 2024;3(1). doi:10.1007/s44204-024-00166-7

BibTeX
@article{Hidalgo2024,
  author = {Hidalgo, Javier},
  title = {Parfitian or Buddhist reductionism? Revisiting a debate about personal identity},
  journal = {Asian Journal of Philosophy},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {3},
  number = {1},
  doi = {10.1007/s44204-024-00166-7}
}
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