Detecting collusion in public procurement: lessons from data-driven screening tools
The Japanese Economic Review · 2026-07 · 77 (3) · 437-446
DOI: 10.1007/s42973-026-00261-9 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Japanese Economic Review, online erschienen am 18.05.2026. Verfasst von Kei Kawai. Die Arbeit nennt 12 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: The University of Tokyo.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Collusion in public procurement remains a major challenge for governments. Even when direct evidence of communication is unavailable, coordinated bidding often leaves identifiable traces in auction data. Across several studies, several coauthors and I have developed screening tools using observed bids as inputs. These tools exploit the fact that colluding firms must coordinate their behavior and therefore generate bidding patterns that diverge from those produced under competitive forces. The tools are based on three principles: persistence of designated winners across rebid rounds, the absence of close losing bids, and the presence of rotation or market division patterns. This survey synthesizes the findings of my previous work emphasizing intuitive reasoning over technical detail.
Förderung
- The University of Tokyo
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APA
Kawai, K. (2026). Detecting collusion in public procurement: lessons from data-driven screening tools. The Japanese Economic Review, 77(3), 437-446. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42973-026-00261-9
Vancouver
Kawai K. Detecting collusion in public procurement: lessons from data-driven screening tools. The Japanese Economic Review. 2026;77(3):437-446. doi:10.1007/s42973-026-00261-9
BibTeX
@article{Kawai2026,
author = {Kawai, Kei},
title = {Detecting collusion in public procurement: lessons from data-driven screening tools},
journal = {The Japanese Economic Review},
year = {2026},
volume = {77},
number = {3},
pages = {437--446},
doi = {10.1007/s42973-026-00261-9}
}
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