Robustness in binary-action supermodular games revisited
The Japanese Economic Review · 2026-01 · 77 (1) · 1-13
DOI: 10.1007/s42973-024-00162-9 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Japanese Economic Review, online erschienen am 28.07.2024. Verfasst von Daisuke Oyama und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 9 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, The University of Tokyo.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We show that in all (whether generic or nongeneric) binary-action supermodular games, an extreme action profile is robust to incomplete information if and only if it is a monotone potential maximizer. The equivalence does not hold for nonextreme action profiles.
Förderung
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
- The University of Tokyo
Zitieren
APA
Oyama, D., & Takahashi, S. (2026). Robustness in binary-action supermodular games revisited. The Japanese Economic Review, 77(1), 1-13. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42973-024-00162-9
Vancouver
Oyama D, Takahashi S. Robustness in binary-action supermodular games revisited. The Japanese Economic Review. 2026;77(1):1-13. doi:10.1007/s42973-024-00162-9
BibTeX
@article{Oyama2026,
author = {Oyama, Daisuke and Takahashi, Satoru},
title = {Robustness in binary-action supermodular games revisited},
journal = {The Japanese Economic Review},
year = {2026},
volume = {77},
number = {1},
pages = {1--13},
doi = {10.1007/s42973-024-00162-9}
}
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