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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Does Medical Malpractice Liability Matter for Proper Calibration of Mixed Payment Systems?

Marina Cavalieri, Paolo Lorenzo Ferrara, Massimo Finocchiaro Castro, Calogero Guccio, Domenico Lisi

Italian Economic Journal · 26.07.2026

DOI: 10.1007/s40797-026-00401-5 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Italian Economic Journal, online erschienen am 26.07.2026. Verfasst von Marina Cavalieri und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 67 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Ministero dell'Università e della Ricerca, Università degli Studi di Catania.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The effect of medical malpractice liability on physicians’ behavior remains poorly understood as does its interaction with payment systems. In this paper, we examine whether the effectiveness of a standard, optimally calibrated, mixed payment system in inducing an efficient (socially optimal) level of service provision is influenced by the presence of malpractice liability. Using a controlled laboratory setting, we investigate the role of medical malpractice liability on physicians’ service provision under capitation, fee-for-service, and mixed payment systems. We consider four between-subject treatments, each referring to a pure payment system (either fee-for-service or capitation) and a mixed one. Each treatment includes four within-subject conditions that differ in payment systems (pure vs. mixed), the order in which the pure and mixed systems are played and the presence/absence of medical liability (no liability vs. liability). We find that while the mixed payment system mitigates the under- and over-provision induced by capitation and fee-for-service, respectively, the introduction of liability pressure leads to a significant deviation from the optimal level of treatment that is not corrected by a standard mixed system. Our empirical findings confirm the existence of defensive medical practices and indicate that malpractice liability has substantial policy relevance for the optimal design of physician payment systems. Moreover, under capitation, liability—when combined with physician altruism—may align incentives with socially efficient care, generating outcomes comparable to those of an optimally calibrated mixed payment scheme.

Förderung

  • Ministero dell'Università e della Ricerca
  • Università degli Studi di Catania

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APA

Cavalieri, M., Ferrara, P. L., Castro, M. F., Guccio, C., & Lisi, D. (2026). Does Medical Malpractice Liability Matter for Proper Calibration of Mixed Payment Systems?. Italian Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40797-026-00401-5

Vancouver

Cavalieri M, Ferrara PL, Castro MF, Guccio C, Lisi D. Does Medical Malpractice Liability Matter for Proper Calibration of Mixed Payment Systems?. Italian Economic Journal. 2026. doi:10.1007/s40797-026-00401-5

BibTeX
@article{Cavalieri2026,
  author = {Cavalieri, Marina and Ferrara, Paolo Lorenzo and Castro, Massimo Finocchiaro and Guccio, Calogero and Lisi, Domenico},
  title = {Does Medical Malpractice Liability Matter for Proper Calibration of Mixed Payment Systems?},
  journal = {Italian Economic Journal},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1007/s40797-026-00401-5}
}
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