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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Econometric equilibria for non-cooperative games

Enrico G. De Giorgi, Andrin Pelican

Economic Theory Bulletin · 2026-12 · 14 (2)

DOI: 10.1007/s40505-026-00330-7 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Economic Theory Bulletin, online erschienen am 16.11.2026. Verfasst von Enrico G. De Giorgi und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 23 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: University of St.Gallen.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Game theory and econometrics are foundational tools of economic analysis. This paper introduces a game-theoretic framework in which players use econometric methods to infer opponents’ behavior from data. Each player observes a finite sample of her opponent’s past actions, estimates the opponent’s mixed strategy, and plays a best response to this estimate. An econometric equilibrium is a strategy profile such that the distribution of these sample-wise best responses coincides with the profile that generates the data. We prove existence of econometric equilibria. For finite samples, econometric equilibria generally differ from Nash equilibria. However, as the number of observations grows, econometric equilibria converge to the set of Nash equilibria whenever players use (uniformly) consistent estimators. The results provide an asymptotic verifiability interpretation of Nash equilibrium: if players agree on a Nash equilibrium and check the agreement against a large record of past play, no player has a significant incentive to deviate, while agreements on profiles far from Nash equilibria do not survive such checks.

Förderung

  • University of St.Gallen

Zitieren

APA

Giorgi, E. G. D., & Pelican, A. (2026). Econometric equilibria for non-cooperative games. Economic Theory Bulletin, 14(2). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-026-00330-7

Vancouver

Giorgi EGD, Pelican A. Econometric equilibria for non-cooperative games. Economic Theory Bulletin. 2026;14(2). doi:10.1007/s40505-026-00330-7

BibTeX
@article{Giorgi2026,
  author = {Giorgi, Enrico G. De and Pelican, Andrin},
  title = {Econometric equilibria for non-cooperative games},
  journal = {Economic Theory Bulletin},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {14},
  number = {2},
  doi = {10.1007/s40505-026-00330-7}
}
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