Product competition and R&D investment under spillovers within full or partial collusion games
Latin American Economic Review · 2015
DOI: 10.1007/s40503-015-0018-6 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Latin American Economic Review, 2015. Verfasst von Kai Zhao. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 9-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 19 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The paper investigates firms’ behavior and outcomes (levels of cost-reducing R&D, output, profit and welfare in equilibrium) in a differentiated duopoly with process innovation. One of the important features in this paper is that spillovers operate in the R&D stage and are tied to the degree of product substitutability as well as the extent of technological proximity/alienation of the research paths leading to cost reduction. Using this feature, the paper tries to explore and compare four separate organization setups (Full Competition, Semi-collusion in Production, Semi-collusion in R&D and Full Collusion). It is found that under technological proximity, competitions at the upstream stage depress R&D investment, and firms colluding in R&D regardless of their production strategy always yield more profit and generate higher social welfare than firms colluding in output; under technological alienation, R&D cooperation may reduce firms’ interest to invest in R&D, and it is possible that firms in the Full Collusion regime produce most and generate the highest level of social welfare.
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APA
Zhao, K. (2015). Product competition and R&D investment under spillovers within full or partial collusion games. Latin American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40503-015-0018-6
Vancouver
Zhao K. Product competition and R&D investment under spillovers within full or partial collusion games. Latin American Economic Review. 2015. doi:10.1007/s40503-015-0018-6
BibTeX
@article{Zhao2015,
author = {Zhao, Kai},
title = {Product competition and R&D investment under spillovers within full or partial collusion games},
journal = {Latin American Economic Review},
year = {2015},
doi = {10.1007/s40503-015-0018-6}
}
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