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An Optional Delinked Reward System: Making Pharmaceutical Innovation Work for Everyone

Aidan Hollis iD

Applied Health Economics and Health Policy · 2024

DOI: 10.1007/s40258-023-00860-2 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Applied Health Economics and Health Policy, 2024. Verfasst von Aidan Hollis. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Economics, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada. ahollis@ucalgary.ca. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Drug Costs, Commerce. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 32 Literaturangaben.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Conflicts over pharmaceutical pricing are driven by the patients' need for affordable medicines and the producer's reward for the investments in developing innovative medicines. A single price cannot achieve both goals, as it will either obstruct access by patients or provide too low a return to investors. This has led to calls to "delink" the payment for innovation from the price paid for drugs, so that both goals can be met efficiently and without conflict. However, the details of how best to do that are unclear. This paper proposes a specific implementation for delinking the Optional Delinked Reward System (ODRS), which integrates ideas from numerous pharmaceutical reimbursement systems. The ODRS would allow firms to choose either to negotiate a sales price for a drug (as is the current practice in most countries) or to sell their drug at a low "generic" price with a supplementary "delinked" reward based on assessed health benefit. This model builds on recent innovations in drug reimbursement including the UK's Antibiotic Subscription Pilot and the Pneumococcal Vaccine Advanced Market Commitment. The ODRS would ensure affordable and immediate access for patients and a fair reward for innovators.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Drug CostsCommerceHumansCosts and Cost AnalysisPharmaceutical Preparations

Substanzen

Pharmaceutical Preparations

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Economics, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada. ahollis@ucalgary.ca.

ORCID-Profile: Aidan Hollis

Zitieren

APA

Hollis, A. (2024). An Optional Delinked Reward System: Making Pharmaceutical Innovation Work for Everyone. Applied Health Economics and Health Policy. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40258-023-00860-2

Vancouver

Hollis A. An Optional Delinked Reward System: Making Pharmaceutical Innovation Work for Everyone. Applied Health Economics and Health Policy. 2024. doi:10.1007/s40258-023-00860-2

BibTeX
@article{Hollis2024,
  author = {Hollis, Aidan},
  title = {An Optional Delinked Reward System: Making Pharmaceutical Innovation Work for Everyone},
  journal = {Applied Health Economics and Health Policy},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.1007/s40258-023-00860-2}
}
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