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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Plurality rule and unanimity of revealed preference

Alvaro Sandroni

Theory and Decision · 11.08.2026

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-026-10152-5 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theory and Decision, online erschienen am 11.08.2026. Verfasst von Alvaro Sandroni. Die Arbeit nennt 43 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Behavioral models can accommodate some anomalous social choices that result from aggregation of individual preferences. However, the use of behavioral methods of revealed preference in social choice may produce new conceptual difficulties that do not exist under standard economic models. One such difficulty is the problem of unanimity in revealed preference: individual choices may reveal that every individual strictly prefers x to y and yet y is revealed to be strictly socially preferred to x . Under plurality rule, the problem of unanimity in revealed preference holds for some behavioral methods of revealed preference, but not for others.

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APA

Sandroni, A. (2026). Plurality rule and unanimity of revealed preference. Theory and Decision. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-026-10152-5

Vancouver

Sandroni A. Plurality rule and unanimity of revealed preference. Theory and Decision. 2026. doi:10.1007/s11238-026-10152-5

BibTeX
@article{Sandroni2026,
  author = {Sandroni, Alvaro},
  title = {Plurality rule and unanimity of revealed preference},
  journal = {Theory and Decision},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1007/s11238-026-10152-5}
}
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