Social and moral distance in risky settings
Theory and Decision · 2026-12 · 101 (4) · 765-790
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-026-10131-w ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theory and Decision, online erschienen am 09.04.2026. Verfasst von Anastasios Koukoumelis und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 57 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
While many socially desirable actions are risky and involve non-anonymous others, it remains largely untested whether lower subject-subject anonymity affects behavior under risk. In variations of the dictator game, we vary the party who is exposed to risk and manipulate anonymity by reducing the social and moral distance between parties. We propose a model that allows for ex ante and ex post fairness as well as for context-dependent altruism. Consistent with the model, we find that reducing anonymity increases the frequency of equal splits and hyperfair choices. Allocations nonetheless fall when the dictator’s payoff is risky, regardless of the treatment.
Förderung
- Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
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APA
Koukoumelis, A., Levati, M. V., & Nardi, C. (2026). Social and moral distance in risky settings. Theory and Decision, 101(4), 765-790. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-026-10131-w
Vancouver
Koukoumelis A, Levati MV, Nardi C. Social and moral distance in risky settings. Theory and Decision. 2026;101(4):765-790. doi:10.1007/s11238-026-10131-w
BibTeX
@article{Koukoumelis2026,
author = {Koukoumelis, Anastasios and Levati, M. Vittoria and Nardi, Chiara},
title = {Social and moral distance in risky settings},
journal = {Theory and Decision},
year = {2026},
volume = {101},
number = {4},
pages = {765--790},
doi = {10.1007/s11238-026-10131-w}
}
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