Existential reasons for choosing to believe
Synthese · 18.05.2026 · 207 (6)
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-026-05615-9 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Synthese, online erschienen am 18.05.2026. Verfasst von Jonathan Crowe. Die Arbeit nennt 29 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: University of Southern Queensland.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Direct doxastic voluntarism (DDV) holds that we have direct voluntary control over our beliefs. This article offers a modest defence of DDV by focusing on the role in belief formation of what I call existential reasons : reasons a person has to adopt certain actions or attitudes because they wish to be a particular kind of person. I argue that, in at least some cases, a person may choose to believe a proposition because they wish to be the kind of person who would hold that belief. I show how existential belief choices avoid prominent objections to DDV. I conclude by reflecting on the relevance of existential reasons for two specific belief categories: beliefs about legal obligation and beliefs about God.
Förderung
- University of Southern Queensland
Zitieren
APA
Crowe, J. (2026). Existential reasons for choosing to believe. Synthese, 207(6). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-026-05615-9
Vancouver
Crowe J. Existential reasons for choosing to believe. Synthese. 2026;207(6). doi:10.1007/s11229-026-05615-9
BibTeX
@article{Crowe2026,
author = {Crowe, Jonathan},
title = {Existential reasons for choosing to believe},
journal = {Synthese},
year = {2026},
volume = {207},
number = {6},
doi = {10.1007/s11229-026-05615-9}
}
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