Cognitive offloading and the causal structure of human action
Synthese · 16.01.2025 · 205 (2)
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-024-04887-3 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Synthese, online erschienen am 16.01.2025. Verfasst von George Britten-Neish. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 90 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) casts human cognition as constitutively dependent on its bodily and environmental context. Drawing on recent empirical work on ‘cognitive offloading’, HEC’s defenders claim that information processing offloaded onto such brain-external resources is sometimes ‘genuinely’ cognitive. But while debates about offloading have a high profile in philosophy of cognitive science, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the fact that paradigm cases of offloading are intentional actions. As a result, opposition to HEC is driven in part by unarticulated intuitions about the metaphysics of human agency. Thinking of action as a kind of interface between separately constituted intentions and bodily movements can make HEC look problematic. But while this view of agency has been popularised – most prominently by Donald Davidson – as analytic philosophy of action’s ‘standard story’, it has come under pressure from philosophers influenced by Elizabeth Anscombe’s very different account. According to this, actions express an agent’s intention only in so far as they fit into the right kind teleologically structured worldly context. In this paper, I’ll argue that HEC’s supporters should adopt an Anscombean model of action. That is, they should understand cognitive offloading as a manifestation of human agency’s general dependence on its bodily and environmental setting.
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APA
Britten-Neish, G. (2025). Cognitive offloading and the causal structure of human action. Synthese, 205(2). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04887-3
Vancouver
Britten-Neish G. Cognitive offloading and the causal structure of human action. Synthese. 2025;205(2). doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04887-3
BibTeX
@article{BrittenNeish2025,
author = {Britten-Neish, George},
title = {Cognitive offloading and the causal structure of human action},
journal = {Synthese},
year = {2025},
volume = {205},
number = {2},
doi = {10.1007/s11229-024-04887-3}
}
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