For values in science: Assessing recent arguments for the ideal of value-free science
Synthese · 16.09.2024 · 204 (4)
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-024-04762-1 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Synthese, online erschienen am 16.09.2024. Verfasst von Matthew J. Brown. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 26-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 120 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universität Hannover.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
There is a near consensus among philosophers of science whose research focuses on science and values that the ideal of value-free science is untenable, and that science not only is, but normatively must be, value-laden in some respect. The consensus is far from complete; with some regularity, defenses of the value-free ideal (VFI) as well as critiques of major arguments against the VFI surface in the literature. I review and respond to many of the recent defenses of the VFI and show that they generally fail to meet the mark. In the process, I articulate what the current burden of argument for a defense of the VFI ought to be, given the state of the literature.
Förderung
- Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universität Hannover
Zitieren
APA
Brown, M. J. (2024). For values in science: Assessing recent arguments for the ideal of value-free science. Synthese, 204(4). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04762-1
Vancouver
Brown MJ. For values in science: Assessing recent arguments for the ideal of value-free science. Synthese. 2024;204(4). doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04762-1
BibTeX
@article{Brown2024,
author = {Brown, Matthew J.},
title = {For values in science: Assessing recent arguments for the ideal of value-free science},
journal = {Synthese},
year = {2024},
volume = {204},
number = {4},
doi = {10.1007/s11229-024-04762-1}
}
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