Life, sense-making, and subjectivity. Why the enactive conception of life and mind requires phenomenology
Synthese · 05.09.2024 · 204 (3)
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-024-04746-1 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Synthese, online erschienen am 05.09.2024. Verfasst von Juan Diego Bogotá. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 71 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
One of the ideas that characterises the enactive approach to cognition is that life and mind are deeply continuous, which means that both phenomena share the same basic set of organisational and phenomenological properties. The appeal to phenomenology to address life and basic cognition is controversial. It has been argued that, because of its reliance on phenomenological categories, enactivism may implicitly subscribe to a form of anthropomorphism incompatible with the modern scientific framework. These worries are a result of a lack of clarity concerning the role that phenomenology can play in relation to biology and our understanding of non-human organisms. In this paper, I examine whether phenomenology can be validly incorporated into the enactive conception of mind and life. I argue that enactivists must rely on phenomenology when addressing life and mind so that they can properly conceptualise minimal living systems as cognitive, as well as argue for an enactive conception of biology in line with their call for a non-objectivist science. To sustain these claims, I suggest that enactivism must be further phenomenologised by not only drawing from Hans Jonas’s phenomenology of the organism (as enactivists often do) but also from Edmund Husserl’s thoughts on the connection between transcendental phenomenology and biology. Additionally, phenomenology must be considered capable of providing explanatory accounts of phenomena
Förderung
- Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación
Zitieren
APA
Bogotá, J. D. (2024). Life, sense-making, and subjectivity. Why the enactive conception of life and mind requires phenomenology. Synthese, 204(3). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04746-1
Vancouver
Bogotá JD. Life, sense-making, and subjectivity. Why the enactive conception of life and mind requires phenomenology. Synthese. 2024;204(3). doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04746-1
BibTeX
@article{Bogot2024,
author = {Bogotá, Juan Diego},
title = {Life, sense-making, and subjectivity. Why the enactive conception of life and mind requires phenomenology},
journal = {Synthese},
year = {2024},
volume = {204},
number = {3},
doi = {10.1007/s11229-024-04746-1}
}
EUVIMED