Ignorance, soundness, and norms of inquiry
Philosophical Studies · 2024-07 · 181 (6-7) · 1477-1485
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02161-3 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophical Studies, online erschienen am 29.05.2024. Verfasst von Christopher Willard-Kyle. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 9-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 40 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The current literature on norms of inquiry features two families of norms: norms that focus on an inquirer’s ignorance and norms that focus on the question’s soundness . I argue that, given a factive conception of ignorance, it’s possible to derive a soundness-style norm from a version of the ignorance norm. A crucial lemma in the argument is that just as one can only be ignorant of a proposition if the proposition is true, so one can only be ignorant with respect to a question if the question is sound.
Zitieren
APA
Willard-Kyle, C. (2024). Ignorance, soundness, and norms of inquiry. Philosophical Studies, 181(6-7), 1477-1485. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02161-3
Vancouver
Willard-Kyle C. Ignorance, soundness, and norms of inquiry. Philosophical Studies. 2024;181(6-7):1477-1485. doi:10.1007/s11098-024-02161-3
BibTeX
@article{WillardKyle2024,
author = {Willard-Kyle, Christopher},
title = {Ignorance, soundness, and norms of inquiry},
journal = {Philosophical Studies},
year = {2024},
volume = {181},
number = {6-7},
pages = {1477--1485},
doi = {10.1007/s11098-024-02161-3}
}
EUVIMED