Rent seeking and the economics of corruption
Constitutional Political Economy · 2016-06 · 27 (2) · 142-157
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-016-9215-9 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Constitutional Political Economy, online erschienen am 16.04.2016. Verfasst von Toke S. Aidt. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 118-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 67 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The paper studies the influence of Tullock (West Econ J 5:224–232, 1967) and the rent-seeking literature more generally on the study of corruption. The theoretical corruption literature with its emphasis on principal-agent relationships within government and rent creation by corruption politicians has largely, but not entirely, overlooked that contestable rents encourage unproductive use of real resources in seeking these rents. As a consequence, the literature underestimates the value of corruption control and the cost of corruption itself.
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APA
Aidt, T. S. (2016). Rent seeking and the economics of corruption. Constitutional Political Economy, 27(2), 142-157. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-016-9215-9
Vancouver
Aidt TS. Rent seeking and the economics of corruption. Constitutional Political Economy. 2016;27(2):142-157. doi:10.1007/s10602-016-9215-9
BibTeX
@article{Aidt2016,
author = {Aidt, Toke S.},
title = {Rent seeking and the economics of corruption},
journal = {Constitutional Political Economy},
year = {2016},
volume = {27},
number = {2},
pages = {142--157},
doi = {10.1007/s10602-016-9215-9}
}
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