Revisiting the board structure: how staggered board mitigates minority shareholders expropriation
Asia Pacific Journal of Management · 2026-09 · 43 (3) · 1849-1888
DOI: 10.1007/s10490-025-10059-9 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Asia Pacific Journal of Management, online erschienen am 12.11.2025. Verfasst von Shihua Chen und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 137 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Kein Abstract verfügbar.
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
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APA
Chen, S., Wang, L., & Jebran, K. (2026). Revisiting the board structure: how staggered board mitigates minority shareholders expropriation. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 43(3), 1849-1888. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-025-10059-9
Vancouver
Chen S, Wang L, Jebran K. Revisiting the board structure: how staggered board mitigates minority shareholders expropriation. Asia Pacific Journal of Management. 2026;43(3):1849-1888. doi:10.1007/s10490-025-10059-9
BibTeX
@article{Chen2026,
author = {Chen, Shihua and Wang, Luhan and Jebran, Khalil},
title = {Revisiting the board structure: how staggered board mitigates minority shareholders expropriation},
journal = {Asia Pacific Journal of Management},
year = {2026},
volume = {43},
number = {3},
pages = {1849--1888},
doi = {10.1007/s10490-025-10059-9}
}
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