Equilibrium Threshold Strategy and Social Benefit in Observable Markovian Queues with Unreliable Server and Optional Repair
Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica, English Series · 22.08.2026
DOI: 10.1007/s10255-026-0123-0 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica, English Series, online erschienen am 22.08.2026. Verfasst von Xue-lu Zhang und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 24 Literaturangaben.
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APA
Zhang, X., & Gao, S. (2026). Equilibrium Threshold Strategy and Social Benefit in Observable Markovian Queues with Unreliable Server and Optional Repair. Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica, English Series. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10255-026-0123-0
Vancouver
Zhang X, Gao S. Equilibrium Threshold Strategy and Social Benefit in Observable Markovian Queues with Unreliable Server and Optional Repair. Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica, English Series. 2026. doi:10.1007/s10255-026-0123-0
BibTeX
@article{Zhang2026,
author = {Zhang, Xue-lu and Gao, Shan},
title = {Equilibrium Threshold Strategy and Social Benefit in Observable Markovian Queues with Unreliable Server and Optional Repair},
journal = {Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica, English Series},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1007/s10255-026-0123-0}
}
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