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Strategic behavior and entry deterrence by branded drug firms: the case of authorized generic drugs

Lu Yao, Mengde Liu

The European Journal of Health Economics · 2025-06 · 26 (4) · 561-575

DOI: 10.1007/s10198-024-01721-y ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The European Journal of Health Economics, online erschienen am 24.09.2024. Verfasst von Lu Yao und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: China Univeristy of Political Science and Law, Beijing, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Drugs, Generic, Drug Industry, Economic Competition. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 38 Literaturangaben.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Pharmaceutical firms that market brand-name drugs lose substantial market share to generic manufacturers after patent expiration. As a response to the threat of generic competition, branded manufacturers pursue defensive strategies. One such strategy is the launch of authorized generic drugs. Authorized generic drugs are produced by branded manufacturers to compete against other generic drug entrants. Such competition may lower the expected profits of generic drug manufacturers and hence deter future generic drug entry. This paper models and empirically examines whether the introduction of authorized generic drugs changes the independent generic firms' decisions on entering the market. We use an instrumental variable approach to evaluate the effect of authorized generic drugs on the responses of generic manufacturers. The results show that the entry of authorized generic drugs deters and delays the entry of generic drugs.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Drugs, GenericDrug IndustryEconomic CompetitionHumans

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

Authorized generic drugsBrand name drugsGeneric drugGeneric entry deterrenceMarket competition strategyPharmaceutical industry

Substanzen

Drugs, Generic

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • China Univeristy of Political Science and Law, Beijing, China.
  • Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, China. liumengde@bit.edu.cn.

Zitieren

APA

Yao, L., & Liu, M. (2025). Strategic behavior and entry deterrence by branded drug firms: the case of authorized generic drugs. The European Journal of Health Economics, 26(4), 561-575. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-024-01721-y

Vancouver

Yao L, Liu M. Strategic behavior and entry deterrence by branded drug firms: the case of authorized generic drugs. The European Journal of Health Economics. 2025;26(4):561-575. doi:10.1007/s10198-024-01721-y

BibTeX
@article{Yao2025,
  author = {Yao, Lu and Liu, Mengde},
  title = {Strategic behavior and entry deterrence by branded drug firms: the case of authorized generic drugs},
  journal = {The European Journal of Health Economics},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {26},
  number = {4},
  pages = {561--575},
  doi = {10.1007/s10198-024-01721-y}
}
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