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The timing of opportunism: political cycles under binding fiscal rules in Brazil

Débora Ferreira, Rodrigo Schneider, Mauricio Bugarin

Economics of Governance · 2026-12 · 27 (1)

DOI: 10.1007/s10101-026-00364-4 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Economics of Governance, online erschienen am 16.06.2026. Verfasst von Débora Ferreira und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 45 Literaturangaben.

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APA

Ferreira, D., Schneider, R., & Bugarin, M. (2026). The timing of opportunism: political cycles under binding fiscal rules in Brazil. Economics of Governance, 27(1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-026-00364-4

Vancouver

Ferreira D, Schneider R, Bugarin M. The timing of opportunism: political cycles under binding fiscal rules in Brazil. Economics of Governance. 2026;27(1). doi:10.1007/s10101-026-00364-4

BibTeX
@article{Ferreira2026,
  author = {Ferreira, Débora and Schneider, Rodrigo and Bugarin, Mauricio},
  title = {The timing of opportunism: political cycles under binding fiscal rules in Brazil},
  journal = {Economics of Governance},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {27},
  number = {1},
  doi = {10.1007/s10101-026-00364-4}
}
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