Optimising the decision threshold in a weighted voting system: the case of the IMF’s Board of Governors
Economics of Governance · 2026-12 · 27 (1)
DOI: 10.1007/s10101-026-00359-1 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Economics of Governance, online erschienen am 08.05.2026. Verfasst von Dóra Gréta Petróczy. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 43 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: National Research, Development and Innovation Office.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In a weighted majority voting game, the players'weights are determined based on the constitutional planner's intentions. The weights are challenging to change in numerous cases, as they represent some desired disparity. However, the voting weights and the actual voting power do not necessarily coincide. Changing a decision threshold would offer some remedy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is one of the most important international organisations that uses a weighted voting system to make decisions. The voting weights in its Board of Governors depend on the quotas of the 191 member countries, which reflect their economic strengths to some extent. We analyse the connection between the decision threshold and the a priori voting power of the countries by calculating the Banzhaf indices for each threshold between 50% and 87%. The difference between quotas and voting powers is minimised if the decision threshold is 58% or 59%.
Förderung
- National Research, Development and Innovation Office
Zitieren
APA
Petróczy, D. G. (2026). Optimising the decision threshold in a weighted voting system: the case of the IMF’s Board of Governors. Economics of Governance, 27(1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-026-00359-1
Vancouver
Petróczy DG. Optimising the decision threshold in a weighted voting system: the case of the IMF’s Board of Governors. Economics of Governance. 2026;27(1). doi:10.1007/s10101-026-00359-1
BibTeX
@article{Petrczy2026,
author = {Petróczy, Dóra Gréta},
title = {Optimising the decision threshold in a weighted voting system: the case of the IMF’s Board of Governors},
journal = {Economics of Governance},
year = {2026},
volume = {27},
number = {1},
doi = {10.1007/s10101-026-00359-1}
}
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