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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Cross-border portfolio ownership and endogenous tax-system divergence under origin taxation

Horn-In Kuo, K. L. Glen Ueng

Journal of Economics · 2027-03 · 148 (1)

DOI: 10.1007/s00712-026-00936-2 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 20.11.2026. Verfasst von Horn-In Kuo und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 13 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Chengchi University.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper examines endogenous choice between ad valorem and specific commodity taxation under the origin principle when residents hold portfolio equity in foreign producers. Although allocation-equivalent instruments implement the same effective marginal cost, they divide operating surplus differently between domestic tax revenue and after-tax profit. Foreign ownership therefore creates an allocation-conditional incidence wedge: with positive operating surplus, a positive ad valorem tax has a higher national value than its specific counterpart, while the ranking reverses for subsidies. This result applies to arbitrary deterministic segmented demands and does not rely on linearity or market symmetry. In the two-stage system-and-rate game, however, governments compare continuation values because a system change induces both rates to adjust. A common institutional disadvantage of ad valorem taxation can make system choices strategic substitutes; when the direct ownership-incidence effect dominates strategic rate feedback, ownership asymmetry can then select which country adopts which system. A numerically verified linear benchmark yields a unique asymmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the country with greater inward foreign ownership adopts a positive ad valorem tax and the other adopts a positive specific tax. Thus ownership selects the direction of differentiation rather than generating it without a countervailing institutional force. The ownership variable is passive resident portfolio ownership, not strategic corporate cross-holdings.

Förderung

  • National Chengchi University

Zitieren

APA

Kuo, H., & Ueng, K. L. G. (2027). Cross-border portfolio ownership and endogenous tax-system divergence under origin taxation. Journal of Economics, 148(1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-026-00936-2

Vancouver

Kuo H, Ueng KLG. Cross-border portfolio ownership and endogenous tax-system divergence under origin taxation. Journal of Economics. 2027;148(1). doi:10.1007/s00712-026-00936-2

BibTeX
@article{Kuo2027,
  author = {Kuo, Horn-In and Ueng, K. L. Glen},
  title = {Cross-border portfolio ownership and endogenous tax-system divergence under origin taxation},
  journal = {Journal of Economics},
  year = {2027},
  volume = {148},
  number = {1},
  doi = {10.1007/s00712-026-00936-2}
}
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