Second opinions in high-stakes credence goods markets: transparency as a discipline mechanism
Journal of Economics · 2026-12 · 147 (4)
DOI: 10.1007/s00712-026-00927-3 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 06.08.2026. Verfasst von Ferdinando Colombo und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 31 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study second opinions in fixed-price credence goods markets, in which strategic experts have strong incentives to overtreat consumers, a phenomenon often observed in healthcare. This setting has been largely overlooked in the literature, likely because second opinions are ineffective: strategic experts always overtreat, and consumers never seek a second opinion. We depart from the benchmark by introducing a share of honest experts – who never overtreat – and a degree of transparency, defined as the probability that an expert providing a second opinion knows that the consumer has already received a prior recommendation. We show that if transparency exceeds a critical threshold, second opinions discipline strategic experts, provided the share of honest experts is neither too low nor too high. We identify the level of transparency that maximizes legitimate welfare – defined as the sum of the consumer’s expected utility and the expected utility experts derive from behaving honestly. Unlike in low-stakes environments, full transparency – though it never maximizes legitimate welfare – still performs better than no transparency.
Förderung
- Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Zitieren
APA
Colombo, F., & Ursino, G. (2026). Second opinions in high-stakes credence goods markets: transparency as a discipline mechanism. Journal of Economics, 147(4). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-026-00927-3
Vancouver
Colombo F, Ursino G. Second opinions in high-stakes credence goods markets: transparency as a discipline mechanism. Journal of Economics. 2026;147(4). doi:10.1007/s00712-026-00927-3
BibTeX
@article{Colombo2026,
author = {Colombo, Ferdinando and Ursino, Giovanni},
title = {Second opinions in high-stakes credence goods markets: transparency as a discipline mechanism},
journal = {Journal of Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {147},
number = {4},
doi = {10.1007/s00712-026-00927-3}
}
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