Fair division with binary valuations: Characterizations
Social Choice and Welfare · 21.11.2026
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-026-01685-3 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Social Choice and Welfare, online erschienen am 21.11.2026. Verfasst von Florian Brandl und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 38 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Ministry of Education - Singapore, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, National University of Singapore.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We consider the fair allocation of indivisible goods with binary valuations. In this setting, the maximum Nash welfare rule, the leximin rule, and all additive welfarist rules with a strictly concave function coincide. We show that for any number of agents, this rule is the only rule that satisfies envy-freeness up to one good, strategyproofness, neutrality, minimal completeness, and invariance under disapproving unassigned goods (IDU). Moreover, we present an alternative characterization for two agents, where we replace IDU with non-redundancy and resource-monotonicity. In both characterizations, all axioms are necessary.
Förderung
- Ministry of Education - Singapore
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
- National University of Singapore
Zitieren
APA
Brandl, F., Suksompong, W., & Teh, N. (2026). Fair division with binary valuations: Characterizations. Social Choice and Welfare. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-026-01685-3
Vancouver
Brandl F, Suksompong W, Teh N. Fair division with binary valuations: Characterizations. Social Choice and Welfare. 2026. doi:10.1007/s00355-026-01685-3
BibTeX
@article{Brandl2026,
author = {Brandl, Florian and Suksompong, Warut and Teh, Nicholas},
title = {Fair division with binary valuations: Characterizations},
journal = {Social Choice and Welfare},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1007/s00355-026-01685-3}
}
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