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A note on the strategic vulnerability of the Boston mechanism in random markets

Josué Ortega

Social Choice and Welfare · 2026-11 · 67 (3) · 617-628

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-026-01655-9 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Social Choice and Welfare, online erschienen am 05.03.2026. Verfasst von Josué Ortega. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 36 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We provide the first asymptotic analysis of the Boston Mechanism under equilibrium play in random markets. We provide two results. First, while 63% of students receive their first preference under truthful reporting–outperforming any other known mechanism in the literature–this rate converges to zero in any Nash equilibrium of the corresponding preference revelation game as the market size grows. Second, we show there exists a Nash equilibrium where the average student receives a dramatically inferior assignment: in markets with 1,000 students, the average placement shifts from the 7th choice (under truthfulness) to the 145th choice, representing a change from logarithmic to nearly linear average rank.

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APA

Ortega, J. (2026). A note on the strategic vulnerability of the Boston mechanism in random markets. Social Choice and Welfare, 67(3), 617-628. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-026-01655-9

Vancouver

Ortega J. A note on the strategic vulnerability of the Boston mechanism in random markets. Social Choice and Welfare. 2026;67(3):617-628. doi:10.1007/s00355-026-01655-9

BibTeX
@article{Ortega2026,
  author = {Ortega, Josué},
  title = {A note on the strategic vulnerability of the Boston mechanism in random markets},
  journal = {Social Choice and Welfare},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {67},
  number = {3},
  pages = {617--628},
  doi = {10.1007/s00355-026-01655-9}
}
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