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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

An extension of May’s Theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting

Wesley H. Holliday, Eric Pacuit

Social Choice and Welfare · 2026-03 · 66 (2) · 395-422

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-025-01598-7 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Social Choice and Welfare, online erschienen am 13.06.2025. Verfasst von Wesley H. Holliday und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 63 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

May’s Theorem [K. O. May, Econometrica 20 (1952) 680-684] characterizes majority voting on two alternatives as the unique preferential voting method satisfying several simple axioms. Here we show that by adding some desirable axioms to May’s axioms, we can uniquely determine how to vote on three alternatives (setting aside tiebreaking). In particular, we add two axioms stating that the voting method should mitigate spoiler effects and the so-called strong no show paradox . We prove a theorem stating that any preferential voting method satisfying our enlarged set of axioms, which includes some weak homogeneity and preservation axioms, must choose from among the Minimax winners in all three-alternative elections. When applied to more than three alternatives, our axioms also distinguish Minimax from other known voting methods that coincide with or refine Minimax for three alternatives.

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APA

Holliday, W. H., & Pacuit, E. (2026). An extension of May’s Theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting. Social Choice and Welfare, 66(2), 395-422. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-025-01598-7

Vancouver

Holliday WH, Pacuit E. An extension of May’s Theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting. Social Choice and Welfare. 2026;66(2):395-422. doi:10.1007/s00355-025-01598-7

BibTeX
@article{Holliday2026,
  author = {Holliday, Wesley H. and Pacuit, Eric},
  title = {An extension of May’s Theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting},
  journal = {Social Choice and Welfare},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {66},
  number = {2},
  pages = {395--422},
  doi = {10.1007/s00355-025-01598-7}
}
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