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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Moral behavior and polarization

Thomas Eichner, Marco Runkel

Economic Theory · 09.11.2026

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-026-01762-9 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Economic Theory, online erschienen am 09.11.2026. Verfasst von Thomas Eichner und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 40 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, FernUniversität in Hagen.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

An individual that follows partial Kantian universalization polarizes and overdraws its strategy in order to compensate for those individuals that she thinks do not choose the same strategy as she does. Within a generalized Alger-Weibull approach with heterogenous homo moralis individuals, the present paper is the first to formalize this polarization incentive. We show that the polarization incentive can be drawn back to an implicit and so far unknown ’preference for dominance’. Applying our new insights to a public good game it turns out that total public good provision may be reduced by an increase in the degree of morality.

Förderung

  • Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
  • FernUniversität in Hagen

Zitieren

APA

Eichner, T., & Runkel, M. (2026). Moral behavior and polarization. Economic Theory. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-026-01762-9

Vancouver

Eichner T, Runkel M. Moral behavior and polarization. Economic Theory. 2026. doi:10.1007/s00199-026-01762-9

BibTeX
@article{Eichner2026,
  author = {Eichner, Thomas and Runkel, Marco},
  title = {Moral behavior and polarization},
  journal = {Economic Theory},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1007/s00199-026-01762-9}
}
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