Cross-ownership in duopoly: Are there any incentives to divest?
Economic Theory · 2025-11 · 80 (3) · 703-744
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-025-01638-4 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Economic Theory, online erschienen am 03.03.2025. Verfasst von Rupayan Pal und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 9-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 59 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: MICIN, Universidad Carlos III.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper shows that in a duopoly a firm has no incentives to divest its passive shares in its rival when firms’ strategies are strategic complements. This holds independently whether goods are substitutes or complements and whether firms engage in simultaneous or sequential move product market competition. However, if firms’ strategies are strategic substitutes and are engaged in simultaneous move competition, it is optimal for both firms to fully divest their shares in their rivals under a private placement mechanism via independent intermediaries or under efficient competitive bidding. Yet, in the sequential move game only the follower has such incentives. Notably, under a private placement mechanism via a common intermediary, there are often circumstances under which there are partial or no firms’ divestment incentives, highlighting that the divestment mechanism employed by firms may have a crucial role on their divestment incentives.
Förderung
- MICIN
- Universidad Carlos III
Zitieren
APA
Pal, R., & Petrakis, E. (2025). Cross-ownership in duopoly: Are there any incentives to divest?. Economic Theory, 80(3), 703-744. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-025-01638-4
Vancouver
Pal R, Petrakis E. Cross-ownership in duopoly: Are there any incentives to divest?. Economic Theory. 2025;80(3):703-744. doi:10.1007/s00199-025-01638-4
BibTeX
@article{Pal2025,
author = {Pal, Rupayan and Petrakis, Emmanuel},
title = {Cross-ownership in duopoly: Are there any incentives to divest?},
journal = {Economic Theory},
year = {2025},
volume = {80},
number = {3},
pages = {703--744},
doi = {10.1007/s00199-025-01638-4}
}
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