Deliberation and the wisdom of crowds
Economic Theory · 2025-03 · 79 (2) · 603-655
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01595-4 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Economic Theory, online erschienen am 24.07.2024. Verfasst von Franz Dietrich und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 9-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 43 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Agence Nationale de la Recherche.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Does pre-voting group deliberation improve majority outcomes? To address this question, we develop a probabilistic model of opinion formation and deliberation. Two new jury theorems, one pre-deliberation and one post-deliberation, suggest that deliberation is beneficial. Successful deliberation mitigates three voting failures: (1) overcounting widespread evidence, (2) neglecting evidential inequality, and (3) neglecting evidential complementarity. Formal results and simulations confirm this. But we identify four systematic exceptions where deliberation reduces majority competence, always by increasing Failure 1. Our analysis recommends deliberation that is ‘participatory’, ‘neutral’, but not necessarily ‘equal’, i.e., that involves substantive sharing, privileges no evidences, but might privilege some persons.
Förderung
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche
Zitieren
APA
Dietrich, F., & Spiekermann, K. (2025). Deliberation and the wisdom of crowds. Economic Theory, 79(2), 603-655. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01595-4
Vancouver
Dietrich F, Spiekermann K. Deliberation and the wisdom of crowds. Economic Theory. 2025;79(2):603-655. doi:10.1007/s00199-024-01595-4
BibTeX
@article{Dietrich2025,
author = {Dietrich, Franz and Spiekermann, Kai},
title = {Deliberation and the wisdom of crowds},
journal = {Economic Theory},
year = {2025},
volume = {79},
number = {2},
pages = {603--655},
doi = {10.1007/s00199-024-01595-4}
}
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