Moral preferences in bargaining
Economic Theory · 2026-02 · 81 (1-2) · 429-452
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01544-7 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Economic Theory, online erschienen am 06.01.2024. Verfasst von Pau Juan-Bartroli und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 55 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: H2020 European Research Council.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We analyze the equilibrium of a bilateral bargaining game (Nash, 1953, Econometrica, 21: 128–140). where at least one of the individuals has a preference for morality (homo moralis). We show that the equilibrium set crucially depends on these moral preferences. Furthermore, our comparative static analyses provide insights into the distributional implications of individuals’ moral concerns and the composition of society. A comparison of the set of equilibria in our model with those under selfish preferences, Kantian equilibrium, fairness preferences, altruistic preferences, and inequality averse preferences reveals important differences.
Förderung
- H2020 European Research Council
Zitieren
APA
Juan-Bartroli, P., & Karagözoğlu, E. (2026). Moral preferences in bargaining. Economic Theory, 81(1-2), 429-452. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01544-7
Vancouver
Juan-Bartroli P, Karagözoğlu E. Moral preferences in bargaining. Economic Theory. 2026;81(1-2):429-452. doi:10.1007/s00199-023-01544-7
BibTeX
@article{JuanBartroli2026,
author = {Juan-Bartroli, Pau and Karagözoğlu, Emin},
title = {Moral preferences in bargaining},
journal = {Economic Theory},
year = {2026},
volume = {81},
number = {1-2},
pages = {429--452},
doi = {10.1007/s00199-023-01544-7}
}
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