Crossref
The set of stable matchings and the core in a matching market with ties and matroid constraints
International Journal of Game Theory · 2026-12 · 55 (2)
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-026-01012-1 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Game Theory, online erschienen am 20.11.2026. Verfasst von Naoyuki Kamiyama. Die Arbeit nennt 28 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Japan Science and Technology Agency.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
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Förderung
- Japan Science and Technology Agency
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APA
Kamiyama, N. (2026). The set of stable matchings and the core in a matching market with ties and matroid constraints. International Journal of Game Theory, 55(2). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-026-01012-1
Vancouver
Kamiyama N. The set of stable matchings and the core in a matching market with ties and matroid constraints. International Journal of Game Theory. 2026;55(2). doi:10.1007/s00182-026-01012-1
BibTeX
@article{Kamiyama2026,
author = {Kamiyama, Naoyuki},
title = {The set of stable matchings and the core in a matching market with ties and matroid constraints},
journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
year = {2026},
volume = {55},
number = {2},
doi = {10.1007/s00182-026-01012-1}
}
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