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The set of stable matchings and the core in a matching market with ties and matroid constraints

Naoyuki Kamiyama

International Journal of Game Theory · 2026-12 · 55 (2)

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-026-01012-1 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Game Theory, online erschienen am 20.11.2026. Verfasst von Naoyuki Kamiyama. Die Arbeit nennt 28 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Japan Science and Technology Agency.

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

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Förderung

  • Japan Science and Technology Agency

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APA

Kamiyama, N. (2026). The set of stable matchings and the core in a matching market with ties and matroid constraints. International Journal of Game Theory, 55(2). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-026-01012-1

Vancouver

Kamiyama N. The set of stable matchings and the core in a matching market with ties and matroid constraints. International Journal of Game Theory. 2026;55(2). doi:10.1007/s00182-026-01012-1

BibTeX
@article{Kamiyama2026,
  author = {Kamiyama, Naoyuki},
  title = {The set of stable matchings and the core in a matching market with ties and matroid constraints},
  journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {55},
  number = {2},
  doi = {10.1007/s00182-026-01012-1}
}
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