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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

A stable and strategy-proof controlled school choice mechanism with integrated and flexible rules

Minoru Kitahara, Yasunori Okumura

International Journal of Game Theory · 2026-06 · 55 (1)

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-026-01000-5 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Game Theory, online erschienen am 07.05.2026. Verfasst von Minoru Kitahara und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 33 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: Tokyo University of Marine Science and Technology.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We examine a controlled school choice model in which students are divided into types and the distribution of admitted students influences schools’ priority structures. We introduce a general class of priority rules that represent priorities as weak orders (allowing ties) for each given assignment and satisfy three axioms: Preference for Diversity, Within-Type Ordering, and Distributional Consistency. This framework includes the adjusted scoring rule, which flexibly integrates reserves, quotas, and bonus-point rules while accounting for uncertainty in applicants’ types and scores. From such priority profiles, we construct choice functions that satisfy substitutability and size monotonicity. We show that the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism with these functions yields matchings that are stable with respect to the original priority profiles and satisfy group strategy-proofness. Moreover, when priority profiles are restricted to linear orders for each given assignment, our mechanism yields a student-optimal stable matching.

Förderung

  • Tokyo University of Marine Science and Technology

Zitieren

APA

Kitahara, M., & Okumura, Y. (2026). A stable and strategy-proof controlled school choice mechanism with integrated and flexible rules. International Journal of Game Theory, 55(1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-026-01000-5

Vancouver

Kitahara M, Okumura Y. A stable and strategy-proof controlled school choice mechanism with integrated and flexible rules. International Journal of Game Theory. 2026;55(1). doi:10.1007/s00182-026-01000-5

BibTeX
@article{Kitahara2026,
  author = {Kitahara, Minoru and Okumura, Yasunori},
  title = {A stable and strategy-proof controlled school choice mechanism with integrated and flexible rules},
  journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {55},
  number = {1},
  doi = {10.1007/s00182-026-01000-5}
}
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