Large incomplete-information games with independent types
International Journal of Game Theory · 2025-06 · 54 (1)
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00932-8 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Game Theory, online erschienen am 25.02.2025. Verfasst von Guilherme Carmona und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 22 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We consider Bayes–Nash equilibria of large semi-anonymous games (i.e., each player’s payoff is determined by his type, his action, and the distribution of the realized types and choices of the others). In a model with finite type and action spaces, we provide a characterization of limits of sequences of Bayes-Nash equilibria as the number of players goes to infinity. Based on this, we show that strict pure-strategy Bayes–Nash equilibria exist in all sufficiently large finite-player games for generic distributions of players’ payoff functions and type distributions.
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APA
Carmona, G., & Podczeck, K. (2025). Large incomplete-information games with independent types. International Journal of Game Theory, 54(1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-025-00932-8
Vancouver
Carmona G, Podczeck K. Large incomplete-information games with independent types. International Journal of Game Theory. 2025;54(1). doi:10.1007/s00182-025-00932-8
BibTeX
@article{Carmona2025,
author = {Carmona, Guilherme and Podczeck, Konrad},
title = {Large incomplete-information games with independent types},
journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
year = {2025},
volume = {54},
number = {1},
doi = {10.1007/s00182-025-00932-8}
}
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