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Large incomplete-information games with independent types

Guilherme Carmona, Konrad Podczeck

International Journal of Game Theory · 2025-06 · 54 (1)

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00932-8 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Game Theory, online erschienen am 25.02.2025. Verfasst von Guilherme Carmona und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 22 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We consider Bayes–Nash equilibria of large semi-anonymous games (i.e., each player’s payoff is determined by his type, his action, and the distribution of the realized types and choices of the others). In a model with finite type and action spaces, we provide a characterization of limits of sequences of Bayes-Nash equilibria as the number of players goes to infinity. Based on this, we show that strict pure-strategy Bayes–Nash equilibria exist in all sufficiently large finite-player games for generic distributions of players’ payoff functions and type distributions.

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APA

Carmona, G., & Podczeck, K. (2025). Large incomplete-information games with independent types. International Journal of Game Theory, 54(1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-025-00932-8

Vancouver

Carmona G, Podczeck K. Large incomplete-information games with independent types. International Journal of Game Theory. 2025;54(1). doi:10.1007/s00182-025-00932-8

BibTeX
@article{Carmona2025,
  author = {Carmona, Guilherme and Podczeck, Konrad},
  title = {Large incomplete-information games with independent types},
  journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {54},
  number = {1},
  doi = {10.1007/s00182-025-00932-8}
}
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