The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent
International Journal of Game Theory · 2021-12 · 50 (4) · 911-925
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00774-0 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Game Theory, online erschienen am 19.04.2021. Verfasst von Christoph Diehl und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 19 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: DFG-EBIM.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Chakraborty and Harbaugh (Am Econ Rev 100(5):2361–2382, 2010) prove the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in one sender one receiver games when the state is multidimensional and the preferences of the sender are state independent. We show that influential equilibria do not survive the introduction of any small degree of Harsanyi-uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about the sender’s preferences in the spirit of Harsanyi (Int J Game Theory 2(1):1–23, 1973).
Förderung
- DFG-EBIM
Zitieren
APA
Diehl, C., & Kuzmics, C. (2021). The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent. International Journal of Game Theory, 50(4), 911-925. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00774-0
Vancouver
Diehl C, Kuzmics C. The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent. International Journal of Game Theory. 2021;50(4):911-925. doi:10.1007/s00182-021-00774-0
BibTeX
@article{Diehl2021,
author = {Diehl, Christoph and Kuzmics, Christoph},
title = {The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent},
journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
year = {2021},
volume = {50},
number = {4},
pages = {911--925},
doi = {10.1007/s00182-021-00774-0}
}
EUVIMED