When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
International Journal of Game Theory · 2014-02 · 43 (1) · 25-36
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-013-0370-1 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Game Theory, online erschienen am 07.03.2013. Verfasst von Peter Duersch und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 34-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 29 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but also imitate-the-best and imitate-if-better. Every decision rule in this class is essentially unbeatable in exact potential games. Our results apply to many interesting games including all symmetric 2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\times $$\end{document}2 games, and standard examples of Cournot duopoly, price competition, public goods games, common pool resource games, and minimum effort coordination games.
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APA
Duersch, P., Oechssler, J., & Schipper, B. C. (2014). When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?. International Journal of Game Theory, 43(1), 25-36. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0370-1
Vancouver
Duersch P, Oechssler J, Schipper BC. When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?. International Journal of Game Theory. 2014;43(1):25-36. doi:10.1007/s00182-013-0370-1
BibTeX
@article{Duersch2014,
author = {Duersch, Peter and Oechssler, Jörg and Schipper, Burkhard C.},
title = {When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?},
journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
year = {2014},
volume = {43},
number = {1},
pages = {25--36},
doi = {10.1007/s00182-013-0370-1}
}
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