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Formal verification of security protocol implementations: a survey

Matteo Avalle, Alfredo Pironti, Riccardo Sisto

Formal Aspects of Computing · 2014-01 · 26 (1) · 99-123

DOI: 10.1007/s00165-012-0269-9 ↗

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Studienprotokoll in der Zeitschrift Formal Aspects of Computing, 2014-01. Verfasst von Matteo Avalle und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 56-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 89 Literaturangaben.

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

Automated formal verification of security protocols has been mostly focused on analyzing high-level abstract models which, however, are significantly different from real protocol implementations written in programming languages. Recently, some researchers have started investigating techniques that bring automated formal proofs closer to real implementations. This paper surveys these attempts, focusing on approaches that target the application code that implements protocol logic, rather than the libraries that implement cryptography. According to these approaches, libraries are assumed to correctly implement some models. The aim is to derive formal proofs that, under this assumption, give assurance about the application code that implements the protocol logic. The two main approaches of model extraction and code generation are presented, along with the main techniques adopted for each approach.

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APA

Avalle, M., Pironti, A., & Sisto, R. (2014). Formal verification of security protocol implementations: a survey. Formal Aspects of Computing, 26(1), 99-123. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00165-012-0269-9

Vancouver

Avalle M, Pironti A, Sisto R. Formal verification of security protocol implementations: a survey. Formal Aspects of Computing. 2014;26(1):99-123. doi:10.1007/s00165-012-0269-9

BibTeX
@article{Avalle2014,
  author = {Avalle, Matteo and Pironti, Alfredo and Sisto, Riccardo},
  title = {Formal verification of security protocol implementations: a survey},
  journal = {Formal Aspects of Computing},
  year = {2014},
  volume = {26},
  number = {1},
  pages = {99--123},
  doi = {10.1007/s00165-012-0269-9}
}
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