Final Offer Arbitration With Asymmetric Evidence
Southern Economic Journal · 03.08.2026
DOI: 10.1002/soej.70060 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Southern Economic Journal, online erschienen am 03.08.2026. Verfasst von Yongjoon Kim und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 26 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
As disputants increasingly rely upon arbitration, it is critical to understand outcomes that are likely to arise from mechanisms like final offer arbitration. While a sizable experimental literature investigating strategic behavior in final offer arbitration exists, that work has overwhelmingly focused on situations where the arbitrator's beliefs about the appropriate resolution are symmetric. This paper considers a setting where the arbitrator's beliefs depend on the strength of each disputant's case. We find that disputant responses to changes in the relative strength of their case generally follow comparative statics predictions even though offers are generally less aggressive than predicted. Further, we find that final offers are closer to theoretical predictions when the variance of the arbitrator's preferences is lower. However, we also observe that disputants become more aggressive the more the arbitrator's preferences are skewed in the disputant's favor.
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APA
Kim, Y., Promi, A., Xue, J., & Deck, C. (2026). Final Offer Arbitration With Asymmetric Evidence. Southern Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.70060
Vancouver
Kim Y, Promi A, Xue J, Deck C. Final Offer Arbitration With Asymmetric Evidence. Southern Economic Journal. 2026. doi:10.1002/soej.70060
BibTeX
@article{Kim2026,
author = {Kim, Yongjoon and Promi, Afia and Xue, Jiatong and Deck, Cary},
title = {Final Offer Arbitration With Asymmetric Evidence},
journal = {Southern Economic Journal},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1002/soej.70060}
}
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